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With great French fanfare the G-20 committed itself in Seoul, 
Korea a year ago “to build a more stable and resilient interna-
tional monetary system (IMS), including by further strength-
ening global financial safety nets.” As subsequently elaborated 
by  French  President  Sarkozy  and  other  French  government 
officials, the agenda for IMS reform included five elements: 
surveillance of the global economy and financial system, the 
international lender-of-last-resort mechanisms (global financial 
safety nets), the management of global capital flows, reserve 
assets and reserve currencies, and IMS governance. 
On the road to the Cannes G-20 summit, the IMS reform 
agenda  along  with  a  number  of  other  important  issues  was 
hijacked by the European crisis. Nevertheless, the G-20 coun-
tries and various international institutions conducted an inten-
sive process of review and discussion of the IMS via conferences, 
working groups, and reports. It is useful to take stock of what 
they did or did not accomplish.
My  summary  assessment  is  that  the  G-20’s  journey 
involved  some  useful  mutual  education,  but  not  much  in 
terms of concrete accomplishments. There were no surprises 
relative to my preliminary expectations in May of this year.1 
On surveillance, the results are disappointing. The focus is on 
process, and there are no substantial new policy commitments 
with one exception. On the lender-of-last-resort issues, there 
only will be marginal steps forward. On the management of 
capital flows, the progress that has been achieved over the past 
several years has been loosely codified, which is a substantive 
achievement. On reserve assets and reserve currencies, there is 
essentially nothing new of note. On governance, the G-20 state-
ments contain the ritually required endorsement of change, but 
not immediately. 
In the remainder of this policy brief, I examine what the 
G-20 accomplished in each of these five areas.
Surveillance of the Global economy 
and financial SyStem
The international monetary system is the set of obligations, rules, 
conventions, procedures, and institutions that shape the interna-
tional economic and financial policies of governments in their 
interactions with each other. Strong obligations and understand-
ings are essential. In particular, each country should recognize its 
responsibility to promote global economic growth and financial 
stability through their policy choices. Equally important is the 
surveillance of whether countries are meeting their responsibili-
ties and the potential for consequences if they are not. 
It would have been desirable if as part of the G-20’s review 
of the surveillance of the global economy and financial system 
they  would  have  embraced  the  establishment  of  a  formal 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) obligation on countries 
1. Edwin M. Truman. 2011. The Outlook for International Monetary System 
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with respect to global growth and financial stability where there 
is none today. It also would have been desirable to establish a 
more robust framework for surveillance of the global economy 
and financial system including potential sanctions for countries 
to create better incentives to play by the rules, old and new. 
Finally, it would have been desirable if the G-20, as part of its 
framework for strong, sustainable, and balanced growth (SSBG) 
and the associated mutual assessment process (MAP), could 
have produced, through a transparent process, a set of specific, 
quantified, and verifiable policy commitments to achieve the 
stated G-20 goals. On each of these three aspects, the G-20 
delivered little in Cannes.
On the question of each individual country’s obligation 
to promote the collective goal of global growth and financial 
stability, the G-20 endorsed (1) procedural advances in the form 
of the continuation of IMF reports on the spillovers of the poli-
cies of the large economies on other economies, (2) the continu-
ation of IMF multilateral surveillance reports that pull together 
the key themes of other IMF multilateral surveillance activities 
with an emphasis on assessments of external imbalances, and 
(3)  the  establishment  of  a  more  formal  framework  through 
which the IMF staff and management integrate their bilateral 
and  multilateral  surveillance  activities.  The  last  piece  could 
become a step toward the establishment of a formal IMF obliga-
tion to promote global growth and financial stability. However, 
these small adjustments to the current system fall far short of 
a robust framework of surveillance of economic and financial 
policies with penalties for shortfalls in performance. Moreover, 
with respect to IMF staff assessments of external imbalances and 
exchange rates, the G-20 only endorsed the IMF’s publication 
of exchange-rate assessments when it is “appropriate” to do so, 
although IMF Managing Director Lagarde, prior to the meeting 
in Cannes, had endorsed the publication of assessments of the 
contribution of exchange rates to external imbalances.
The biggest disappointment coming out of Cannes in this 
area is with respect to the immediate demonstration of collective 
responsibility for SSBG through the MAP. Except with respect 
to possible near-term stimulus measures, no country made a 
new  policy  commitment.  Seven  countries  (Australia,  Brazil, 
Canada,  China,  Germany,  Korea,  and  Indonesia)  agreed  to 
allow their automatic stabilizers to work to cushion the effects 
of any downturn on their own economies and by extension 
on the world economy and to take discretionary measures to 
support domestic demand as appropriate. Aside from this mild 
promise, the Cannes Action Plan for Growth and Jobs offers 
little  near-term  support  for  the  global  economy.  The  broad 
thrust of the G-20 macroeconomic policy framework remains 
focused on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. 
Nine advanced G-20 countries reaffirmed their commit-
ments at the G-20 meeting in Toronto in June 2010 to halve 
their fiscal deficits from 2010 levels by 2013, and to stabilize or 
reduce government debt-to-GDP ratios by 2016. It would have 
been preferable to reprogram those commitments in light of the 
weakened state of the global economy compared with 18 months 
ago.  The  advanced  nine  countries  include  Australia,  Canada, 
Germany, and Korea. The latest IMF Fiscal Monitor projects 
that these four countries will meet their Toronto goals expressed 
in terms of general government fiscal balances. But one can be 
skeptical whether Germany, in particular, will be willing to give 
full play to its automatic stabilizers as German growth slows and 
possibly declines. The IMF Fiscal Monitor projects that France 
and the United States will fall short of their 2013 targets by about 
0.5 and 1.0 percentage points of GDP respectively, but that was 
before the recent markdown of near-term growth in France and 
the announced fiscal response by the government. Italy, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom are the other three advanced G-20 
countries. Each is projected by the IMF to meet its Toronto 
objective. It is not surprising, under the circumstances in the euro 
area, that Italy and Spain did not commit to letting the automatic 
stabilizers come into play in their economies. In the case of the 
United Kingdom, it would appear that the UK authorities have 
declined to promote global economic growth by reprogramming 
their fiscal austerity measures even though they are in a much 
better position to do so than several other countries. 
In addition, very few policy statements by individual coun-
tries were quantified in the G-20 Action Plan for Growth and 
Jobs. The limited number of quantifications that are recorded 
repeat numbers already publicly associated with existing plans. 
Perhaps the G-20 will do better in the future. The leaders said 
that they would hold themselves accountable for delivering on 
their modest commitments, which is positive. The G-20 also will 
continue the MAP indicative guideline procedures designed to 
promote policy coordination, which is better than abandoning 
the exercise. One can hope that in the future the G-20 will also 
be more transparent about the application of those procedures 
and about their policy discussions.2
2. On November 11, 2011, the IMF posted on the IMF website a 203-page 
document of IMF staff reports for the G-20 Mutual Assessment Process which 
provides some indirect insights into the G-20 deliberations.
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On the whole, the G-20 deserves low marks on its perfor-
mance in Cannes on its self-imposed task of improving the 
IMS with respect to surveillance of the global economy and 
financial system.
lender of laSt reSort
Lender-of-last-resort  issues  in  the  IMS  involve  the  condi-
tional, but also the largely unconditional, provision of finan-
cial assistance to countries adversely affected by international 
financial crises. This assistance is principally provided through 
the IMF, but assistance may also flow bilaterally among central 
banks and via regional financing arrangements in Europe and 
in Asia. It would have been desirable if the G-20 had endorsed 
a  broad,  integrated  approach  to  these  issues  that  includes 
the  facilities  available  for  the  IMF  to  lend,  the  resources 
that the IMF can use to support countries in financial crises, 
and  a  robust  framework  of  cooperation  between  the  IMF 
and  regional  authorities  on  mutually  supportive  financial 
and surveillance activities. The G-20 agreements in Cannes 
amount to a minor tweaking of the status quo.
The  leaders  endorsed  a  new  IMF  Precautionary  and 
Liquidity Line (PLL), the details of which are not yet available. 
One consequence of this vacuum is that some observers think 
that the PLL could be used to provide IMF financial assis-
tance to Italy or Spain. This is unlikely as the PLL is intended 
for countries “with strong policies and fundamentals facing 
exogenous, including systemic, shocks.” Few would argue that 
either Spain or Italy now fits this description.
The leaders also noted that central banks have a role to 
play in the provision of global liquidity. But the central banks 
were successful in preventing a commitment to institutional-
izing their arrangements at the global level. It would appear 
that post-Cannes the field is left to the IMF and its new PLL.
On IMF resources, the focus of the G-20 leaders was 
on  the  short-term  rather  than  the  long-term  needs  of  the 
IMS. While committing to make sure that the IMF has the 
resources to play its systemic role in the European crisis, the 
G-20 leaders were unable to achieve a consensus on how to do 
so. It is noteworthy that the possible role of a Special Drawing 
Rights (SDR) allocation came up in this context and is still on 
the table. It remains to be seen what the G-20 leaders might 
have been contemplating when they included a reference to 
SDR in their communiqué. As was the case in 2009, a large 
allocation  of  SDR  could  increase  confidence  by  providing 
a potential source of needed liquidity for many countries if 
the global economy were to plunge back into recession. In 
addition, countries inside as well as outside the euro area, in 
principle, could employ their additional holdings of SDR to 
supplement the resources of the European Financial Stability 
Facility.  For  the  longer  run,  the  IMS  would  benefit  if  the 
IMF had the authority temporarily to issue SDR in a global 
financial crisis, but this desirable reform will have to wait for 
another day or crisis.
The G-20 leaders did agree on “principles” for coopera-
tion between the IMF and regional financial arrangements. 
They  had  been  endorsed  previously  by  the  G-20  finance 
ministers  and  central  bank  governors.  Procedurally,  some 
might consider it a bit odd that these principles should be 
identified with the G-20 rather than with the IMF and the 
relevant regional financial arrangements. On the other hand, 
they are non-binding. 
The principles are a step forward but they fall short of the 
robust procedures that some have advocated.3 Their stated goal 
is laudable: fostering rigorous and even-handed surveillance 
and promotion of common goals of regional and global finan-
cial and monetary stability. However, with respect to lending 
activities they do not go beyond the appropriate recognition 
that competition in laxity with respect to policy conditions 
on lending and facility shopping should be discouraged. On 
lending operations, as well as joint surveillance activities, the 
tone of the principles is defensive and arm’s length. The need 
for cooperation is recognized but not operationalized.
On the lender-of-last-resort element of the IMS reform 
agenda what was delivered in Cannes is not a triumph of G-20 
leadership.
manaGement of capital flowS
Over the past several years, national authorities and the IMF 
and Bank for International Settlements have devoted consid-
erable attention to international capital flows and to analyzing 
the phenomenon of global liquidity. This renewed attention to 
capital movements has focused on inflows as well as outflows 
and on the policies of source countries as well as destination 
countries. While these efforts have not produced full agree-
ment, they have contributed to greater consensus on a topic 
that has been fraught with controversy for decades. It is to the 
credit of those associated with the G-20 that they were able 
3. See C. Randall Henning. 2011. Coordinating Regional and Multilateral 
Financial Policies. Working Paper 11-9. Washington: Peterson Institute for 
International Economics.
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to sustain the degree of consensus that had emerged and to 
produce a set of “coherent conclusions for the management 
of capital flows drawing on country experiences” as the G-20 
finance ministers and central bank governors had promised in 
April of this year.
Of course, the conclusions are explicitly non-binding on 
countries and do not limit national policy choices, except that 
they will affect policy choices. The conclusions correctly state 
that there is no obligation to capital account liberalization 
under the IMF’s legal framework, but they also articulate the 
longer-term goal for G-20 countries to be in a position to 
benefit from “free capital movements, while preventing and 
managing risks that could undermine financial stability and 
sustainable growth, and avoiding financial protectionism.”
Some  critics  who  advocate  the  more  extensive  use  of 
controls over capital movements, as well as those who criti-
cize the policies of countries that condition such flows, will 
be critical of what the G-20 has codified in this area. In my 
view, however, the conclusions appropriately place policies on 
the management of capital flows in the relevant broad policy 
context, stress some of the pitfalls for individual countries and 
the system as a whole (via indirect effects) of national measures 
affecting capital flows, and do not exonerate countries that 
may be responsible for so-called push factors.
The conclusions (1) note classification challenges, but they 
cover measures that do and do not distinguish by residency or 
by currency, including prudential measures; (2) place possible 
measures in the context of other macroeconomic and financial 
stability  policies;  (3)  stress  the  primacy  of  broad  macroeco-
nomic policies and the importance of not using capital flow 
management policies to avoid other needed policy adjustments;   
(4) caution that the use of measures should be temporary (coun-
tercyclical), transparent, and targeted; and (5) acknowledge that 
countries’ situations differ so that the design and application 
of measures affecting capital flows will differ as well. These five 
points provide guidance while not imposing rigid constraints. 
They also contribute to the establishment of a framework for 
more systematic IMF surveillance in this area.
The G-20 conclusions on the management of capital flows 
include a paragraph on the strengthening of financial sectors. 
The paragraph notes both the pluses in terms of a country’s 
absorptive capacity and stability and the minuses in terms of 
increasing a country’s attractiveness as a (perhaps temporary) 
destination for capital flows. This paragraph is linked to a G-20 
action plan to support the development and deepening of local 
currency bond markets. It is difficult to argue with the objec-
tives of the action plan, but the rationale for the initiative is 
greatly  overstated.  The  development  of  local  currency  bond 
markets  can  contribute  to  economic  and  financial  stability 
and potentially affect the composition of international capital 
flows, but it is much more debatable whether or to what extent 
doing so will contribute to the stability of the IMS by reducing 
reliance on foreign saving, attenuating external imbalances, or 
mitigating the need for large precautionary reserve holdings, as 
is claimed as a benefit of the G-20 action plan.
Nevertheless,  of  the  five  elements  of  the  IMS  reform 
agenda, the G-20 achieved the most on this element because 
it was able to codify an emerging consensus.
reServe aSSetS and reServe currencieS
Many observers point to the role of national currencies as the 
principal weakness of the IMS today. Those observers hoped 
that the G-20-sponsored IMS reform discussions would result, 
for example, in agreed limitations on the reserve role of the US 
dollar. They were off the mark in their analysis, in my view. 
Their underlying complaint is with the dollar’s role as an inter-
national currency in the international financial system, which is 
dominated by decisions of private sector actors and institutions. 
Moreover, the dollar is not the only international currency today; 
the list grows longer with each passing quarter, and the scale and 
currency composition of international financial assets is largely 
demand determined. Nevertheless, the focus of ruminations by 
the G-20 and within the IMF over the past year or so has been on 
promoting SDR as a replacement for the dollar as a reserve asset 
and promotion of the SDR to become a currency that is managed 
internationally. In the end, those ruminations, which one can 
hope were mutually educational, produced nothing of note.
The G-20 statement on the topic tellingly, but implicitly, 
recognizes  the  reality  of  the  international  financial  system 
today in the relevant subheading in the Cannes Declaration: 
“reflecting the changing economic equilibrium and the emer-
gence of new international currencies.” The international finan-
cial system and its IMS subcomponent have been evolving for 
decades toward a multi-currency system. That evolution has 
accelerated somewhat over the past 15 years since the birth of 
the euro, but there is little that collective public policy decisions 
can do to promote that evolution. 
The initial paragraph in the Cannes Declaration on this 
element focuses on exchange rates and states a commitment to 
“move more rapidly toward more market-determined exchange 
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rate  systems  and  enhance  exchange  rate  flexibility  to  reflect 
underlying economic fundamentals, avoid persistent exchange 
rate misalignments and refrain from competitive devaluations.” 
Tellingly, these fine words speak more to the element of IMS 
reform that deals with surveillance of the global economy and 
financial system than to the role of reserve assets or currencies.
With respect to reserve assets in general and the SDR in 
particular,  the  G-20  statement  expresses  agreement  with  the 
status quo in which the currency composition of the SDR basket 
reflects the role of currencies in the global trading and financial 
system. These are the existing criteria for including a national 
currency in the SDR basket. The IMF is asked to clarify them, 
and the G-20 promises to return to this issue in 2015 if not 
before. The subtext behind this agenda item is the inclusion of 
China’s yuan in the SDR basket, which is probable and desirable 
at some point in the future. Some thought that in return for a 
commitment that the yuan would be included in the SDR basket 
sooner rather than later China would either commit to increasing 
the flexibility of their exchange-rate regime in the direction of 
more rapid appreciation or put forward a more explicit timetable 
for liberalizing capital outflows and inflows, but the Chinese 
authorities declined to take the bait. From their perspective the 
gain in terms of political recognition apparently did not outweigh 
the potential losses in terms of the management of capital inflows 
and outflows and other economic and financial objectives. 
For the future, the Cannes Declaration mentions continuing 
to work on the role of the SDR in the IMS, including as a 
“reference for appropriate reforms.” I regard these words as a 
sop to those who favor the creation of an international currency 
divorced from national decision makers. I hope that the G-20 
and the IMF will now set these issues aside to focus on more 
important matters, such as limiting the accumulation of inter-
national reserves. The SDR could play a role in this area if at 
the same time the major countries were willing to recognize 
their obligations with respect to the performance of the IMS 
as a whole and submit to constraints on their decisions that 
affect prospects for global growth and financial stability via their 
reserve accumulation policies.
Meanwhile, coming out of Cannes, the G-20 has nothing 
at which to point as substantive achievements on reserve assets 
and reserve currencies in the IMS.
imS Governance
A well-functioning IMS within a robust international financial 
system must be supported by a governance structure that is 
both legitimate and effective. Indeed, French President Sarkozy 
included reform of global governance on his initial G-20 agenda 
and commissioned a report on this broad topic from UK Prime 
Minister Cameron. The Cannes Declaration contains several 
concluding paragraphs on governance that are primarily focused 
on the future and organization of the G-20 itself. 
On governance of the IMS, which in principal is lodged 
in the IMF and loosely related groups such as the G-20, the 
leaders in Cannes broke no new ground. The G-20 statement 
repeated the commitment to implement expeditiously the IMF 
quota and governance reforms agreed in Seoul in 2010, which 
are intended to be in place by the fall of 2012. Implicit in this 
commitment  is  the  associated  agreement  to  move  forward 
over the next year to consider again reforming the IMF quota 
formula so that it can be used in 2013 to reach agreement on 
a further increase in IMF quotas by January 2014. The rele-
vant language in the Cannes Declaration on IMS governance 
reforms is a commitment to “an appropriate transition toward 
an IMS which better reflects the increased weight of emerging 
market economies.” In addition, the G-20 leaders agreed that 
their ministers and governors should be more involved in the 
International  Monetary  and  Financial  Committee  (IMFC), 
which in principle could enhance the IMFC’s role in surveil-
lance over the global economy and financial system, including 
via increased transparency.
On balance, with respect to governance of the IMS, the 
G-20 leaders broke no new ground.
concluSion
The IMS reform agenda was overwhelmed in Cannes by the 
European crisis. Flaws in the IMS had little to do with the global 
financial crisis or the European coda directly. This is one reason 
why the IMS reform agenda did not generate much traction 
in advance of the G-20 leaders’ meeting. The European crisis 
might have some lessons for IMS reform in terms of what is 
realistic and desirable, but it will take some time to absorb those 
lessons. Based upon the results of the IMS reform discussions in 
2011, it will also be some time before there is meaningful IMS 
reform. Some IMS reforms are desirable, but few are essential. 
Meanwhile, the system will continue to evolve.
[T]he G-20 has nothing at which to point 
as substantive achievements on reserve 
assets and reserve currencies in the IMS.
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